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INTRODUCTION 
 
When discussing Russia, Western diplomats have 
recently started to refer to its “new assertiveness” . 
It is clearly Moscow’s intention to realign its relations 
with the West in a way that would reflect the 
conviction - prevalent among the Russia’s elites - 
that the Russian Federation has regained 
superpower status or is well on the way to do so. 
Russian elites are convinced that the European Union 
has hit a cul-de-sac. Incapable of threshing out a 
common foreign policy, it is gradually becoming a 
loose conglomerate of nation states, which – given 
an attractive alternative – will opt for good relations 
with a powerful Russia - at the expense of certain 
‘problem countries’. This conviction has entailed the 
activation of Russian policy towards Europe and the 
Euro-Atlantic area. By the same token, Russia is 
posing an ever greater challenge to the West, and in 
particular to the European Union, which has recently 
been preoccupied with its internal affairs - not least 
with enlargement  and adopting and ultimately 
ratifying a new Reform Treaty. It is the aim of this 
report to present the process of shaping European 
Union’s policy towards  Russia, both in Brussels and 
in individual European capitals. 
The first part of the analysis is devoted to interests of 
the European Union as a whole in regard to Russia. 
Statements by EU politicians leave no doubt as to the 
necessity to retain the Russian Federation as a 
strategic partner. This stems primarily from the two 
players’ immediate proximity. From an EU 
perspective, cooperation with Russia is indispensible 
in order to guarantee security on the European 
continent, including holding off diverse threats in the 
domain of so-called hard and soft security, or 
resolving conflicts in the CIS. Russia also remains EU 
members’ biggest single purveyor of energy 
resources, and both this market’s significance and 
potential is showing a growth trend. Moreover, 
Russia’s stance can help the EU in the process of 
buttressing the latter’s role and weight on the 
international arena as a global player (though the 
differences between the two actors are 
underestimated). 
In the second part, the report analyzes Russia’s 
policy towards selected European states: Germany, 
France, Italy, United Kingdom, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic states, Romania and 
Poland. Germany is a country with the closest ties to 
the Russian Federation, and particularly active in 
improving EU-Russia relations. France is currently in 
the process of overhauling its Russia policy. In the 
case of the United Kingdom, economic ties intertwine 
with growing political problems. Countries of the so-
called ‘New Europe’ evince different models of 
relations with Russia. 
The report’s third section discusses EU-Russia 
relations. Recently, the most noticeable process in 
this domain has been the emergence - within the 
European Union - of a single coherent view of Russia. 
In part due to processes in internal and foreign policy 
of the Russian Federation and in part to the 
accession of New Member States, a perception of 
Russia among EU members has become more 
realistic and consequently more uniform. A separate 
issue relates to the functioning of EU-Russian 
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institutions, which - as recent summit meetings have 
shown - seem to have exhausted their potential. 
Despite the fact that the EU’s infrastructure for 
dialogue with Russia is unmatched by any of the 
bloc’s other bilateral engagements, what is in effect a 
crisis in EU-Russia relations has not been averted. 
The sundry problems dogging the bilateral rapport 
include energy security, policy towards a shared 
neighbourhood, Russia’s domestic policy, its attitude 
towards conflicts in Europe (especially in the 
Balkans) and the RF’s anti-Western foreign and 
defence policy. One reason for tensions in bilateral 
relations is the activation of EU policy in the so-called 
shared neighbourhood. This has been instantiated by 
elaborating a new policy towards CIS countries (ENP 
Plus), creating the so-called Black Sea Synergy, 
adopting a strategy in regard to Central Asia, all of 
which have been perceived by Russia as attempts to 
‘grab’ the Russian sphere of influence. The systemic 
crisis in EU-Russia relations is amply reflected in the 
stalled negotiations over the PCA2, i.e. a new 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Poland’s 
move to block the start of talks has but deferred 
possible further deepening of the crisis in the rapport 
between Russia and the EU, given the fundamental 
differences between the two sides concerning the 
shape of the PCA2 treaty. 
EU-Russian relations remain to some extent 
independent of individual EU members’ Russia 
policies. This is the result both of the elaborate 
infrastructure for EU-RF dialogue, as well as of the 
particularity of the problems dealt with. At the same 
time, the situation means that neither of the models 
presented in the second part of this report has 
dominated EU-Russian relations. The inability of any 
one country to foist its vision of relations with 
Moscow on the others may be a good starting point 
for elaboration of a common EU policy towards 
Russia. On the other hand EU’s inability to engage 
Russia in a positive manner may lead to the 
bilateralisation (or nationalization) of relations with 
Moscow by individual member-states which could 
weaken the European Union as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Does Europe need Russia?  
The EU’s and member states’ interests in 
regard to Russia 
 
 “The relationship between the EU and Russia is one 
of the biggest and most complicated challenges in 
European politics and foreign policy. It affects every 
significant European and Russian interest - energy, 
climate change, trade, security, crime, migration, the 
Middle East, Iran, the Balkans.”1 
Among European neighbours the Russian Federation 
stands out as the most powerful, politically, 
economically and militarily. EU politicians and officials 
alike have dubbed Russia “the most important 
strategic partner”, and consider it a key priority “to 
build a strong strategic partnership with Russia 
based on a solid foundation of mutual respect.”2 
Speaking of Russia, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU 
External Relations Commissioner, indicated its triple 
role “immediate neighbour; important strategic 
                                                     
1 EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson’s Bologna address 
“The EU and Russia: our joint political challenge,” 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches
_articles/sppm147_en.htm, April 20th 2007. 
2 Cf. External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner’s 
address to the Austrian-Russian Friendship  
Association “Die EU und Russland: Partner, Nachbarn und 
globale Akteure,” 15.06.2007, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPE
ECH/07/407&format=HTML&aged=0&language=DE&guiLangu
age=en.; “EU-Russia Relations”, European Commission, 
External Relations, May 2007, s. 3, 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/summit_05_07/2
007_eng.pdf.  
partner; important and increasingly self-confident 
global partner.”3 
Such an approach to the Russian Federation, 
underscoring the necessity of a strategic relationship 
with Russia, has persisted in unaltered form since the 
early 1990s, despite far-reaching changes to 
Russia’s own situation. Neither politicians nor 
analysts questioned the importance of the 
relationship between the Russian Federation and the 
European Union. On the contrary, there was 
prevailing emphasis on the indispensability of 
cooperating with Moscow, with the desired relations 
defined persistently as a strategic partnership. This 
indicates that factors determining the EU’s intentions 
and interests in regard to Moscow were durable, the 
preeminent being immediate proximity, forecast and 
desired economic symbiosis, as well as like stances 
on the crucial issues in bilateral relations and in the 
global situation.  
However, the character of this neighbour relationship 
has undergone significant change with the 
enlargement of the EU to cover Central European 
states in 2004 and 2007, and with Russia taking 
steps to alter the character of mutual relations in 
practically all domains. 
 
a. Neighbours 
Russia’s proximity to the European Union and its 
immediate frontier with several member states 
determine the basic framework for EU interests in 
regard to the Russian Federation. The European 
Security Strategy, adopted as early as December 
                                                     
3 Waldner, op.cit. 
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2003, named Russia as “a major factor in our 
[Europe’s] security and prosperity.”4 The EU’s 
principal, or what are viewed as crucial, interests in 
regard to its Eastern neighbour include: 
- Maintaining political and economic stability 
within the RF; 
- Development in the FR of a political model 
close to that of EU members, founded on 
the adoption of western values: democracy, 
respect for human rights and the rule of law, 
and market economy; 
- Constructive approach by the FR towards its 
near abroad, including, inter alia, respect for 
sovereignty of former Soviet republics, 
observance of international law and 
cooperation in regard to conflicts in their so-
called shared neighbourhood (or in effect 
on CIS territory). 
Despite efforts to thresh out the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP), the EU’s most pressing 
task is to convert these long term vital interest into 
immediate policy aims and political practice in the 
event of Russia’s refusal to cooperate. 
An additional difficulty the EU countenances in 
determining its aims with respect to Russia is posed 
by their internal incoherence, most egregious in the 
simultaneous promotion on the one hand of stability 
and on the other, of the rule of law or—more 
ambitiously—democratization. All the while, the idea 
that respect for shared values is essential to the EU’s 
                                                     
4 “A Secure Europe for a Better World: European Security 
Strategy”, Brussels, 12 December 2003, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, 
p. 14. 
implementation of the notion of strategic partnership 
with Russia has always constituted a specific 
component of the Union’s approach towards Russia. 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU External Relations 
Commissioner, has emphasized that Russia has 
agreed to observe certain rules (as member of the 
Council of Europe or OSCE) and ought now to stick by 
them. Here, she pointed to the role of the free media, 
especially of the electronic variety, as well as to the 
importance of civil society. According to her, the test 
shall come with the elections to the Duma in 2007 
and the presidential race in 2008, both of which 
OSCE observers should be invited to watch.5 This 
stance is shared by some analysts, e.g. Fraser 
Cameron, who underscores that the EU cannot cease 
its attempts to coax Russia into accepting European 
values.6 Others question such an approach, among 
them Katinka Barysch, who points to the need to 
drop the idea of founding a relationship with Russia 
on shared values.7 
Another element of EU interests in regard to Russia is 
the problem of managing and solving conflicts in the 
European Union’s near abroad, above all in the 
Balkans and the post-Soviet region. In the former 
case, the EU wants Russia at least to refrain from 
blocking processes leading to conflict resolution.8 
Meanwhile, the conflict in Kosovo presents the 
                                                     
5 Waldner, op.cit. p. 3. 
6 See Fraser Cameron, “Prospects for a New EU-Russia 
Agreement”, The Moscow Times, 19 March 2007. 
7 Cf. Katinka Barysch, “Russia, realism and EU unity”, CER policy 
brief, July 2007.  
8 Practically ever since the withdrawal of its troops from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 2003, Russia has shown little interest in the 
region; only with the prospect of Kosovo’s independence in the 
offing did the Kremlin notice the possibility of using support for 
Serbia to its own ends, which lead to its reengagement in the 
Balkans. 
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parties with clearly differing interests, as attested to 
by their divergent stances, with Russia viewing the 
issue as one not limited to the region.9 
In the case of the post-Soviet region, Moscow’s 
cooperation is a precondition for resolving the 
simmering conflicts. Yet with respect to the so called 
frozen conflicts in the CIS, EU representatives seem 
unable to find a satisfactory solution to the situation 
whereby the Kremlin’s interests dictate that it 
conserve the status quo, which provides it with 
means to pressure other regional players without 
engendering overt confrontation with the West. At the 
same time these same EU officials, among them 
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, indicate that their 
aim is not to limit Russian influence in the post-Soviet 
region.10 In a similar vein, Commissioner Mandelson 
attempted to demonstrate that the EU accepts 
Russian interests in the former Soviet republics, but 
rejects the idea of spheres of influence on the 
European continent.11 
Proximity with Russia also impacts decisively on the 
EU’s wish to cooperate in the domain of so called soft 
security. Here, a large part of the challenges flows 
either directly or indirectly from Russian territory or 
that of other countries in the shared region. 
Cooperation with Russia is evoked in dealing with new 
security threats, such as terrorism, crime, illegal 
migration or human trafficking.12 However, this 
requires voluntary cooperation, as well as 
undertaking a series of specific steps, also on the 
part of the RF (the first of these was the entry into 
                                                     
9 Cf. Waldner, op.cit., p. 5. 
10 Cf. Waldner, op.cit., p. 3. 
11 Mandelson, op.cit. 
12 See “EU-Russia Relations”, op.cit., p. 3. 
force on July 1st, 2007, of the readmission 
agreement). 
 
b. Energy 
The second place in the hierarchy of EU interests in 
regard to Russia is occupied by the question of the 
RF as supplier of natural resources. The EU depends 
on Russia for much of its crude oil and gas, and this 
situation shall not change over the medium term. 
The European Union describes its relations in the 
energy domain as “mutual interdependence of 
supply, demand, investment and know-how.” Russia 
is the world’s biggest gas producer, and is second 
only to Saudi Arabia in oil production. It boasts 5% of 
global oil reserves, as well as 20% of the planet’s 
gas. It has a stake in 30% of the EU’s oil imports 
(27% of consumption), and 44% of gas imports 
(24% of consumption).13 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU 
External Relations Commissioner, has indicated that 
“within the EU we require a predictable and sure 
supply of raw materials, and Russia requires 
predictable demand and an attractive market for its 
products.”14 At the same time, the EU suggests that 
Russia also needs this market to invest in its existing 
energy infrastructure. However, it is in Europe’s 
interest to avoid energy dependence on Russia.15 
EU postulates in the domain of energy can be 
summed up as follows: 
- Gaining access to transit infrastructure; 
- Gaining access to deposits; 
                                                     
13 See “EU-Russia Relations”, op.cit., pp. 5-6. 
14 Waldner, op.cit., p. 4. She went on to say that Austrian 
experience in this regard has been good, as Russia always has 
been and remains a reliable supplier. 
15 Mandelson, op.cit. 
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- Investment security; 
- Adopting such general principles of 
cooperation as transparency, the rule of law, 
mutuality, non-discrimination, openness and 
access to markets. 
European countries are striving to secure the 
abovementioned long term interests by prodding 
Russia to ratify the Energy Charter and to sign the 
Transit Protocol. In view of the Kremlin’s persistent 
refusal to acknowledge these documents, the EU has 
moderated its stance and now opts for the 
incorporation of a number of Energy Charter 
provisions in the text of a new agreement with 
Russia, the so called PCA 2.16 
At the same time distinct differences with regard to 
energy issues endure within the EU. On the one 
hand, some states remain to a greater or lesser 
extent dependent on imports of energy resources, 
and especially gas, from Russia. On the other, some 
countries are entirely free of such burden. This is 
complicated further by divergent views of Russia’s 
reliability as a partner—certain states worry that 
Russia is prepared to resort to “energy blackmail” in 
order to attain its objectives (Poland, Baltic states), 
while others perceive Russia as a reliable, and more 
importantly, more stable supplier than any available 
alternatives (principally France, Germany and 
Austria). Evidently, the situation has changed over 
the past two years, about which more is said in 
Chapter 2 below. 
                                                     
16 See Vedomosti, October 10th 2006. 
Russia is also an important partner in the fight 
against climate change, which is high on the list of EU 
priorities.17 
 
c. Economy 
Russia remains an important economic partner of 
European Union, though the relationship exhibits a 
distinct asymmetry. The EU market is of far greater 
importance to Russia than Russia’s is to the EU. In 
2006, Russia is placed third as regards EU imports 
(136 bln euros, 10.1%) and exports (71.7 bln 
euros, 6.2%) alike. It is worth noting, however, that 
particular countries’ attitude and their future plans 
are determined in part by the fact that Russia is one 
of the more promising emerging markets, with the EU 
as its biggest foreign investor, which mitigates the 
mentioned asymmetry. 
The question of opening the Russian market (good 
investment climate, respect for rights of foreign 
investors) constitutes the core of EU efforts in  this 
domain. The issue could well be decided by Russia’s 
admission to the WTO, which would certainly improve 
the RF’s observance of international economic 
standards. Membership of the OECD also carries 
great importance.18 In the longer term, it is in the 
EU’s interest to gradually integrate Russia with the 
European single market.19 From the standpoint of 
economic relations, the EU has most to gain by 
harmonizing Russian and EU law. While Moscow 
broadly rejects such a conception (regarding it as 
evidence of inequality within the relationship), it has 
                                                     
17 See “EU-Russia Relations”, op.cit., p. 3; cf. Waldner, op.cit., p. 
5. 
18 Waldner, op.cit. p. 4. 
19 Cf. Mandelson, op.cit. 
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entertained the possibility of adopting EU legal 
framework in the economic sphere.20 
The EU wants Russia to increase its purchases in the 
European market—e.g. airplanes from Airbus—at 
the expense of America. Simultaneously, there is 
growing desire to defend the single market from 
expansion by cash wielding enterprises de facto 
controlled by the Russian state. The EU is trying to 
limit Russia’s influence in strategic industries, such as 
defence. In particular, politicians turned their 
attention to EADS, where Russian representatives 
were refused decision rights in the company,21 
attempts to take over German communications giant 
Deutsche Telekom, or British retail gas supplier 
Centrica. 
This picture becomes ever more complex if one were 
to consider the role of economic circles—in recent 
months those of Great Britain and Germany—
concerned about worsening relations with Moscow, 
which could eventually hurt the interests of myriad 
European corporations operating in the Russian 
market. The EU is working towards a PCA2 that would 
secure both sides’ interests and open each others’ 
markets based on the mutually respected principle of 
free competition, predictability and respect for law, 
thus laying the foundations for future construction of 
an EU-Russia Common Economic Space. 
On the other hand, particular countries have begun 
to express concern about increasing financial clout of 
Russian, Chinese or Arab state enterprises and 
                                                     
20 See Igor Shuvalov’s comment from September 5th 2006 to 
the RIA Novosti news agency. 
21 After Vneshtorgbank purchased 5% of EADS shares in 
September 2006, declaring readiness to increase its stake in 
the company. 
government run investment funds capable of taking 
over controlling stakes in corporations deemed to be 
of strategic importance. Michael Glos, Germany’s 
finance minister, suggested that any foreign 
companies wishing to acquire more than 25% of 
shares in large German firms should be required to 
win government approval.22 French and Spanish 
debate has proceeded in a similar direction with talk 
of defending the so called “national industry 
champions.” This has raised eyebrows at the 
European Commission, since such measures not only 
alienate external actors, but also contravene 
European regulations on free movement of capital 
within the EU. Nonetheless, support for retaining 
control over particular important companies in EU 
countries has also been voiced by Günter Verheugen, 
Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry, who 
proclaimed that “I think the question that must be 
discussed is how we can defend our strategic 
interests without violating our most important 
principles of the freedom of movement of capital in 
the internal market.”23 
Moscow has already launched a campaign, pointing 
to unequal treatment of its own enterprises in the EU 
single market while European governments demand 
equal treatment of European firms in Russia. 
 
d. The European Union’s and Russia’s global 
role 
Both president Vladimir Putin’s internal and his 
foreign policy is prompting European elites to revise 
their relationship with the Russian Federation, albeit 
                                                     
22 See Financial Times, 10.08.2007. 
23 European Voice, 26.07.2007 
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often with noticeable reluctance. The period of 
accepting in good faith suggestions that shifts away 
from democratic principles are only temporary 
measures serving to strengthen the state after years 
of Yeltsinian chaos, has irrevocably drawn to a close. 
In the wake of president Putin’s Munich address, 
Russia is viewed as a country that has made a 
choice. And this choice is at odds with European 
Union members’ earlier plans and hopes. 
Russian conduct on the international stage 
demonstrate that: 
- Russia wants to occupy the place of a power 
that can co-decide the fate of Europe and 
the world; 
- The point of reference for Russian foreign 
policy is the United States, and not the 
European Union, whose role in foreign or 
security policy is ignored; 
- Russia is aiming to weaken the bond 
between the USA and Europe through 
playing EU members against one another 
and utilising popular disenchantment with 
the policies of the Bush administration. 
Retracing the train of though apparently dominant in 
leading EU countries, it seems that there is 
acquiescence to Russia’s rising role, and that 
opposition to certain aspects of unilateralist and 
excessively belligerent American policy is regarded as 
convergent with their own opinions, however 
discreetly they may now be expressed. Moreover, it is 
believed that Russia’s growing clout may—without 
overly antagonizing Washington—become the way 
for the EU to play a more prominent role as a global 
actor. Arguments in favour of such a hypothesis 
include Russia’s seat on the UN Security Council, or 
its involvement in many areas riven by conflicts 
whose resolution is in the EU’s interests. 
Commissioner Waldner has underscored that Russia 
“plays a decisive role in all areas of world politics.”24 
Here, two main spheres are indicated: regional 
conflict resolution and the drive to halt proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction. To this may be 
added combating international terrorism and 
arresting climate change.25 
Hopes for internal development of the Russian 
Federation into a liberal democracy and a free 
market economy and for a rapid external course 
towards close cooperation founded on shared values, 
have been durably dispelled. Diplomatic platitudes 
and declarations of the community of values and 
interests concealed political reality only for a while. 
Over the past two years it transpired that Russian 
and EU interests in many regions of the world do not 
converge, and as a result the potential for EU-
Russian cooperation, both bilateral and global, had 
been exaggerated. With respect to the most burning 
Middle Eastern issue there is virtually no 
appreciation, be this deliberate or not, of how little 
sway Moscow actually holds over the situation in the 
region (despite a degree of propaganda presence 
and delivering weapons to individual countries), and 
in the case of Iran, of Moscow’s interests in 
prolonging the crisis around that country’s nuclear 
ambitions. The definition of state sponsored 
international terrorism also set the EU apart from 
                                                     
24 Waldner, op.cit., p. 5. 
25 Waldner, op.cit., p. 5. 
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Russia, as exemplified by the latest British-Russian 
row. 
Today, Russia’s foreign policy construes international 
crises as focusing along the axis “USA-rest of the 
world,” which, in turn, the Muslim world interprets, 
whether Europe likes it or not, as “West-rest of the 
world.” This provides Russia with the opportunity to 
demand concessions, present itself as a mediator 
and demonstrate its indispensability in the smooth 
functioning of the international order. Economic 
interests notwithstanding, this either provokes a 
more positive response or greater wariness in 
relations with Moscow. Analysis of particular crises 
shows that as minimum minimorum Russian 
authorities are expected to remain neutral and refrain 
from shoring up states and forces hostile towards the 
European Union and its relations with the United 
States. Meanwhile, Moscow gives the impression that 
its strategic objectives still target: 
1. Strengthening bilateral relations with the larger 
European states, rather than accepting the 
European Union as a new actor in global politics; 
2. Weakening US presence in Europe and its 
influence on foreign and security policy of EU 
member states. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
1. Models of cooperation with Russia 
 
In many European countries the question of 
cooperation with Russia constitutes—besides 
relations with the United States—the key foreign 
policy issue. Moscow’s policy, meanwhile, means that 
approaches to Russia and to ways of constructing 
relations therewith differ from country to country. 
Several of the larger states, in particular Germany, 
France and Italy gladly accept Russia’s offer, in 
keeping with a long tradition of forging bilateral 
“special relationships”. Others, such as the Benelux 
countries or Spain, take their cue from Germany and 
France, albeit with smaller economic or political clout. 
New EU member states, especially those bordering 
the Russian Federation, are still in the process of 
establishing stable relations with Moscow and strive 
for “europeization” of relations between major EU 
players and Russia, fearing that bilateral “special 
relationships” of “old” Europe’s heavyweights may 
prove detrimental to their own position, interests and 
even security, principally as regards energy supplies. 
Meanwhile, the Kremlin authorities are having trouble 
grasping the upshot of these countries’ accession to 
the European Union and NATO. 
 
a. Germany—draw and bind 
In recent years, German policy in regard to Russia 
can be divided into two stages, closely bound up with 
the Federal Republic’s chancellors of the day. During 
the reign of Gerhard Schroeder, Germany’s eastern 
policy melded leadership in eastward expansion of 
the European Union with the forging of far-reaching, 
long-term and purportedly strategic, and 
concurrently strongly personalized relations with the 
Russian Federation.26 German-Russian agenda was 
fuelled largely by the vision of building a special 
relationship. This was based above all on economic 
interests, but also took the form of joint opposition, 
together with France under president Chirac, against 
unilateralist American engagement in Iraq. The three 
countries’ leaders shared a platform in promoting the 
principle of multilateralism. This alarmed the new EU 
member states which demand europeization of 
German-Russian relations. The most conspicuous 
expression of Russia’s “special relations” with some 
EU countries was the accord reached with Germany 
regarding the construction of the Nordstream Gas 
Pipeline across the Baltic seabed. Concomitantly, 
certain symbolic gestures underscored the specific 
links connecting Moscow, Berlin and Paris, for 
instance inviting French and German leaders to 
celebrate the 750th anniversary of Kaliningrad, while 
snubbing those of the neighbouring states, i.e. 
Lithuania and Poland. 
When Angela Merkel (CDU) assumed the office of 
German chancellor, relation between Germany and 
Russia experienced a palpable change. While Russia 
remained Germany’s desired strategic partner, the 
ambience of mutual relations transformed. The two 
newly preeminent elements were Angela Merkel’s 
                                                     
26 Iris Kempe, From a European Neighborhood Policy toward a 
New Ostpolitik – The Potential Impact of German Policy, CAP 
Policy Analysis, No. 3, May 2006, p. 5. Cf. Sabine Fischer, “Die 
EU und Russland: Konflikte und Potentiale einer schwierigen 
Partnerschaft”, SWP-Studien, 34, Dezember 2006. 
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more sceptical attitude towards Vladimir Putin and 
her readiness to voice critical opinions of violations of 
human rights, and failure to pick up on Russia’s 
proposals to tighten cooperation over energy (e.g. 
Putin’s suggestion in September 2006 that Germany 
become the gas distribution hub for northern 
Europe). All the while, Germany has resolved to 
continue work over the Nordstream gas pipeline. 
German policy towards Russia is influenced by the 
disagreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD 
within the “grand coalition” as regards the manner in 
which this policy is to be conducted. Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, the SPD foreign minister, appears to 
follow in the footsteps of Gerhard Schroeder, though 
the Chancellery has had relative success in wresting 
control over policy towards the Kremlin. As early as 
during the election campaign the CDU stressed the 
need to maintain good relations with Moscow, while 
hinting at a potential policy change consisting in 
placing these relations in a transatlantic context, 
taking into account Central and Eastern European 
interests, and at the necessity to consider Russia’s 
internal situation. SPD, on the other hand, tended to 
avoid the topic of Russia relations. Mr Steinmeier, in 
contrast to Ms Merkel, did not make any reference to 
Polish or Lithuanian security worries. According to 
the coalition agreement relations with Russia are to 
take into consideration not just shared interests, but 
also shared values, and present both a bilateral and 
a European dimension. At the same time support for 
Ukraine, and especially its independence and 
sovereignty (though not necessarily quick EU 
accession) became a priority.27 
German policy aimed to use the double presidency 
(of the EU and G8) in the first half of 2007 to 
improve relations with Russia. The conception of 
“rapprochement through closer ties”, elaborated by 
the German foreign ministry, became the practical 
expression of this approach.28 According to it Berlin 
wanted to link Russia with Europe irreversibly. Shared 
values were not envisaged as a precondition for the 
partnership, but ultimately as its possible upshot, 
resulting from multilayered cooperation. The 
conception’s authors are aware of Russia’s and the 
EU’s differing paths to development, but recognize 
the country’s role in European security architecture, 
especially as regards energy, and also in conflict 
resolution, for instance in the Middle East or the 
Balkans.29 This foreign office strategy document was 
blocked by the Chancellery and never saw the light of 
day. 
Signally, in a series of press interviews which 
appeared in the first days of Germany’s EU 
presidency, Berlin made public several problems 
besetting relations with Moscow. Chancellor Angela 
Merkel confirmed the desire to maintain the strategic 
partnership with Russia and the intention to begin 
talks on a new agreement to regulate the legal terms 
                                                     
27 Kempe, From a European Neighborhood Policy… pp. 12-15. 
In the author’s view the newly formed coalition decided that 
Germany ought to get Russia to cooperate with the EU, albeit 
only on certain conditions. Berlin was to assume leadership in 
the europeization of policy towards Moscow. 
28 Although the document was never published, some of its 
theses were leaked to the press, e.g. Handelsblatt, August 
2006, or Honor Mahony in EUobserver.com, 01.09.2006. 
29 Evgeny Grigiriev, “Sblizenie putiom perepletenia”, 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5.09.2006. 
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of the EU-Russia relationship as quickly as possible. 
Still, she criticized Moscow’s energy policy and 
pointed to the need for reciprocity in economic 
relations, warning that closing off the Russian market 
to European firms would result in similar measures 
on the part of the Europeans.30 In another statement, 
chancellor Merkel remarked that “we need to make 
sure that the Baltic pipeline does not work against 
Poland.”31 Having picked up on Moscow’s resistance 
towards the proposal to sign a separate Energy 
Treaty that would include guarantees for transit 
countries, Germany has resolved to try and 
incorporate into the planned PCA2 provisions 
ensuring the stability of Russian supplies of energy 
resources to Europe. Moreover, as evinced by 
chancellor Merkel’s statement on the Nordstream 
Baltic pipeline, German government is concerned 
about the potential threat of Russia’s using its energy 
supplies to political ends. 
The meeting between Mr Putin and Ms Merkel in 
Sochi in January 2007 did not bring any results. 
Chancellor Merkel underscored the extant “strategic 
interdependence” between Russia and the EU. 
However, she evidently expected the Kremlin to lift 
trade restrictions on Polish products in the name of 
cooperation. The chancellor made it clear that 
Russian embargo on Polish meat is not a bilateral 
spat between Warsaw and Moscow, but an issue 
involving the entire EU and Russia. German 
government sources later unofficially confirmed that 
Angela Merkel was personally disappointed with 
flagrant lack of goodwill on the part of Mr Putin. 
                                                     
30 Financial Times, January 2, 2007. 
31 The Times, January 9, 2007. 
In the opinion of Alexander Rahr, Berlin is unable to 
conduct as autonomous a policy towards Russia 
during its stint at the EU’s helm, as it could in other 
circumstances, while in the longer run Russia is going 
to have to talk to the EU as a whole, and not just to 
individual countries, as is the case at present.32 
Andreas Schockenhoff, German government’s 
coordinator in charge of relations with Russia, says 
that cooperation shall improve when Russia begins to 
treat the EU as a single bloc. He claims that the EU 
has every right to “butt in” into Russian affairs, 
because Russia committed itself to adopting 
European values when it became member of the 
Council of Europe.33 
It is also worthy of note that Germany counted on 
Finland’s opening PCA2 talks with Russia during its 
own EU presidency in the second half of 2006, which 
would make it easier of the Germans to conclude 
them. The Polish veto blocking the opening of PCA2 
negotiations has meant that Germany had no choice 
but to concentrate first and foremost on an attempt 
to reopen stalled talks, putting paid to their earlier 
plans. 
Shortage of anticipated successes in bringing order 
to relations with Russia during Germany’s EU 
presidency served to deepen CDU top brass’s 
scepticism and made the notion of “rapprochement 
through closer ties” more realistic. Meanwhile, 
German government began publically and assertively 
to raise the issue of protecting its own and the EU’s 
market against dangerous expansion of outside 
                                                     
32 Alexander Rahr, “Na evropeskom yazykie”, Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, January 22, 2007. 
33 An interview with Alexander Schockenhoff in Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, May 29, 2007. 
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corporations in sensitive industries , which may well 
scupper Russian designs of economic expansion. The 
German-Russian summit in Wiesbaden in October 
2007 confirmed the existence of divergences 
between Berlin and Moscow, though at the same time 
showing that ever closer economic cooperation 
constitutes a sturdy foundation for bilateral relations. 
 
b. France—crucial partner: from soloist to 
orchestra 
Until Nicholas Sarkozy took over as president the 
general impression was that French-Russian relations 
resemble those between Russia and Germany. 
Summit meeting were just as frequent, both countries 
willingly declared strategic partnership, with the 
Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis coming to life in the 
aftermath of the Iraq war in the years 2002-2005. 
France under Jacques Chirac remained one of 
Russia’s most important advocates on the European 
stage. Russia did not need to fear criticism coming 
from Paris. 
The change at Elysées in 2007 was a decisive factor 
shaping French policy is that French-Russian 
relations lack a basis for a durable strategic 
partnership which would make these relations 
independent of whoever was in charge in Paris. 
Although some shared institution do exist, e.g. the 
security council where foreign and defence ministers 
meet twice a year, the current level of economic 
cooperation nowhere near matches the ostensible 
political partnership.34 Unlike in Germany’s case 
                                                     
34 Evidence for this can be found by looking at the volume of 
Russian-French trade (13 bln USD in 2006) which is below that 
between Russia and Poland (14 bln USD). 
Russia is not France’s main partner in the energy 
domain, though it does remain an important market 
for French investment. Fraught relations with 
Washington also meant that France was “resigned” 
to  seek support for its global stature in Moscow, 
directly and through its role within the EU. 
The presidential campaign already saw Nicholas 
Sarkozy imply that he will alter the way in which policy 
towards Russia is conducted. The then presidential 
candidate commented, for example, that Putin had 
done a lot of good for Russia, but he ought to be 
asked about Chechnya, Georgia and Ukraine. Sarkozy 
unequivocally implied that he shall not be as 
unquestioning towards Russia as his predecessor, 
while expressing his conviction about the need to 
cooperate with Moscow. “Russia—great power of the 
future. A democratic alliance between Russia and 
Europe is necessary,” he asserted.35  
The shift in focus as regards the French attitude to 
Russia became apparent in the August policy address 
at the ambassadors’ conference. President Sarkozy 
exhorted Russia to desist from using energy as a 
political tool: “Russia is imposing its return to the 
world scene by making somewhat brutal use of its 
assets, especially oil and gas, while the world, 
especially Europe, is hoping that it will make an 
important and positive contribution to settling the 
issues of our time that its regained status 
warrants.”36 
                                                     
35 See Andrei Terehov “Poslie Chiraca”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
19.02.2007, and interview with George Sokoloff, ibid. 
36 Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, at the 
opening of the fifteenth Ambassadors' Conference, 28.08.2007, 
http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais/speeches_and_do
cuments/2007/ 
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Russian pundits doubt that the new president is bent 
on significant and durable change of policy towards 
Russia.37 All the more so in view of the fact that the 
Russian market remains an attractive destination for 
French business. In April 2007 Alstom signed an 
agreement with Russia’s Atomenergoprom to create 
a joint venture to deliver nuclear energy equipment. 
On July 13, 2007 oil giant Total was admitted by 
Gazprom to tap reserves in the Shtokman oilfield. 
This was Russia’s attempt to prevent bilateral 
relations from deteriorating, improving the climate 
before a visit by the French president. This took 
place in October 2007 and although it resulted in 
practically no agreements, it did show that the new 
president’s manner may not live up to pre-election 
pledges: Nicholas Sarkozy made no mention 
whatever of any issues causing tensions in European-
Russian relations. 
Doubtless France would be keen to retain particularly 
close ties to Russia. On the one hand Moscow has for 
decades been regarded as a traditional geopolitical 
partner and was an important market for French 
industry. On the other, there is mounting concern 
over the course of Russian policy. France is perhaps 
less anxious about Russia’s use of energy as a policy 
tool, since Gaz de France extended the contract for 
gas supplies due to expire in 2011 until 2030, but 
still views this tactic as a problem in relations with 
other EU members. 
President Sarkozy’s avowed desire to strengthen the 
European Union as a global power shall in all 
                                                                               
speech_at_the_opening_of_the_fifteenth_ambassadors_confe
rence.79296.html. 
37 Yulia Petrovskaya “Sarkozy v poiskah strategy”, 
Nezawisimaya Gazeta, 29.08.2007. 
likelihood lead him to thrash out a common European 
policy in regard to the Russian Federation, in which a 
realistic evaluation of Moscow’s conduct shall play an 
important role.38 It may be assumed that the mostly 
symbolic value of “geopolitical partnership” will 
dwindle in Moscow’s eyes due to unexpected 
emergence of entirely new factors in French policy. 
Breaking with the predominant tradition has pushed 
Paris closer in the direction of Washington and has 
lead to the declaration in September 2007 that 
France is considering its return to NATO military 
structures. 
 
c. Italy—energy above all 
Good relations with Russia are a permanent fixture of 
Italian diplomacy. Silvio Berlusconi’s policy did not 
expire when Romano Prodi replaced him as prime 
minister. Such bilateral political contacts do not 
translate into any more ambitious initiatives, be they 
bilateral or pan-European. 
Both countries maintain lively economic ties, with 
Russia becoming Italy’s biggest export market 
outside the EU.39 Italy, meanwhile, is Russia’s third 
most important trading partner by volume, after 
Germany and China (27.7 bln USD in 2006). 
Rome is preoccupied with ensuring access to Russian 
natural resources. In November 2006, Eni extended 
its contract with Gazprom until 2035.40 Italy is also 
more open than other European countries to Russian 
                                                     
38 Such revision of French policy towards greater realism and 
closer cooperation with EU partners is suggested, among 
others, by Thomas Gomart in “La politique russe de la France: 
fin de cycle?”, Politique étrangère, 72, no. 1/2007. 
39 Barysch, Three questions…, p. 9. 
40 Ewa Paszyc, Gazprom w Europie 2006 – przyspieszenie 
ekspansji, Warszawa: Orodek Studiów Wschodnich 2007. 
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investment. Thus, for instance, Gazprom was 
permitted to enter the Italian market for retail gas 
suppliers. At the same time, Eni is Gazprom’s main 
partner in the domain of southern European 
investment. On June 23rd, 2007 the two firms signed 
a memorandum to construct the so-called 
Southstream gas pipeline. The new 900 km link 
would run along the Black Sea bed from 
Novorossiysk to Bulgaria, where it would split into 
two separate lines: one going to Austria and Slovenia 
via Romania and Hungary, the other to Italy via 
Greece. The project is set to commence in 2008. It 
gained further plausibility when on November 22nd, 
2007, the two firms signed an additional agreement. 
 
d. Great Britain—difficult partner 
The handover of power in Britain in mid 2007 has 
not lead to any significant alteration in the broad 
terms of British policy in regard to Russia, simply 
intensifying already existing tensions. Prime minister 
Gordon Brown’s assertive response to Russia’s 
refusal to extradite Andrei Lugovoy, charged by the 
Crown Prosecution Service with the murder of 
Alexander Litvinenko in London in November 2006, 
has provoked a diplomatic crisis. Expulsion of 
diplomats ensued on both sides. London was taken 
aback by Russia’s resumption of the cold war 
practice of sending strategic bombers on patrol 
flights close to British airspace. Although the current 
fraught relations are an immediate consequence of 
the Litvinenko murder, tensions have been mounting 
over the past several years.41 
The United Kingdom was the first big European state 
to criticize the course of Russian foreign and 
domestic policy under Mr Putin, following an initial 
period of high hopes for closer cooperation with 
Russia. This attitude was reciprocated by the Russian 
side. In the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation, published in March 2007, the UK was 
described as an important though difficult partner. 
Trade, investment and countering terrorism was 
deemed the most important element of bilateral 
relations conducive to cooperation, while factors 
hindering it involved activity of “new political 
émigrés” and the “messianic tendencies” of a part of 
the British elite.42 
Among the most vexed issues is London’s willingness 
to give political asylum, or even citizenship, to 
individuals the Kremlin regards as political opponents 
(the most well-known examples include the oligarch 
Boris Berezovsky, Akhmed Zakayev, representative of 
the Chechen government in exile, and Alexander 
Litvinenko himself). 
In turn, the United Kingdom protested against 
Russian attacks on British investors—depriving Shell 
of a stake in the Sakhalin-2 project and forcing TNK-
BP to sell its share in the Kovykta gas field. 
Moreover, London has censured Russia for the way it 
conducts its energy policy, also towards its 
apprehensive neighbours, and for its internal policy. 
                                                     
41 Andrew Monaghan (ed.), “The UK and Russia – the Troubled 
Relationship”, Russian Series 17/07, Conflict Studies Research 
Centre, May 2007. 
42 See Obzor vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsiy, Moscow: 
MID 2007, www.mid.ru. 
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At the same time the Russian market remains 
sufficiently attractive to British firms for London to 
strive to calm relations with Moscow and limit the 
negative consequences of the crisis provoked by 
Litvinenko’s death.  
From Moscow’s vantage point an additional negative 
factor is the close British-American alliance and 
London’s vocal support for US presence on the 
European continent. The United Kingdom also 
supports and is involved in the American anti-missile 
defence shield project in Europe. 
 
e. Hungary—paragon of new member state 
Hungary, especially under the socialist coalition in 
power since 2002, remains in Russia’s view the 
“model” Central European partner. Budapest does 
not raise historically tricky issues and responds 
positively to Russian interests, particularly in the 
energy domain, making a coherent common EU 
energy possible all the more difficult to construct. 
 Hungary’s policy is aptly illustrated by prime 
minister Ferenc Gyrucsány’s September 2006 visit to 
Moscow, where the main topic was Russian-
Hungarian economic cooperation, specifically in 
energy. Among issues discussed was the planned 
construction of new gas pipelines and underground 
gas storage facilities. Prime minister Gyurcsány 
expressed his support for Russia’s increased role in 
ensuring the European Union’s energy security. 
Another topic broached was that of building a rail 
transport corridor linking Russia and Hungary, and a 
deal was signed over cooperation in farming and the 
food industry. Hungary plays a double role in Russian 
plans to augment gas supplies to Southern Europe: 
that of a transport hub and a regional gas 
distribution centre. 
Budapest’s policy allows Moscow to portray Hungary 
as a “paragon of a pragmatic approach” for other 
Central European states. The Kremlin stresses 
Hungary’s constructive role in the development of 
Russian relations with NATO and the EU and the 
decision de facto to refrain from raising historical 
questions in bilateral contacts. The “reward” for this 
stance was president Putin’s official apology (during 
his visit to the Hungarian capital in March 2006) for 
the bloody military quashing of the Budapest uprising 
of 1956. 
  
f. Slovakia—do not aggravate 
Russian-Slovak relations are very good, though 
several issues remain unresolved—the sale of 
Transpetrol’s stocks and license agreements in the 
defence industry. Both countries declare that upon 
expiry in 2008 of the present accords on gas transit 
new transit agreements shall be signed together with 
new contracts for the supply of Russian gas to 
Slovakia. President Putin expressed Russian 
readiness to participate in the expansion of Slovak 
nuclear power plants. Information emerges regularly 
that the Russians are prepared either to sell 
Transpetrol’s shares to Slovakia (49% of the stocks 
plus management rights constitute a part of Yukos’s 
foreign assets), or to sell them to a Russian firm that 
would take Slovak interests into account (e.g. by 
allowing the Slovak side to nominate the majority of 
voting board members). At the same time Russia 
wants to settle the license agreement issue, allowing 
Russian firms to begin modernization of Slovak 
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military equipment. A transit country, Slovakia, like 
Hungary, plays a vital role in Russian policy of energy 
expansion. It is also a valued political partner in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
g. The Czech Republic—policy shift 
Czech Republic has long adopted the policy of not 
straining relations with Russia. This translated into, 
among others, good economic relations (the Czech 
president’s visit to Moscow saw the conclusion of 
contracts totalling some 1.5 bln USD) and 
conciliatory gestures on the part of the Russians 
regarding certain unresolved historic issues. Moscow 
was irked by critical remarks on its domestic policy by 
the former president Vaclav Havel, notably eschewed 
by the current president, Vaclav Klaus. In contrast, in 
the last year or so was the preeminent source of 
disagreement has been the present government’s 
staunchly transatlantic course and its approval to 
participate in the American missile defence shield 
programme, with the possible construction on Czech 
soil of a tracking radar. 
 
h. Baltic states—stubborn realists 
In view of relatively recent historical experience, all 
Baltic states underscore their sovereignty, NATO and 
EU membership and participation in the Euroatlantic 
community. Despite this, there are discernable 
differences in their policies towards Russia, 
irrespective of efforts to create a common front. 
Baltic states’ policy in regard to their erstwhile 
colonial overlord is greatly influenced by 
contradictory factors. On the one hand, their 
economies reap benefits from their location as transit 
countries. On the other, they are clearly vulnerable to 
Russian energy blackmail, a problem exacerbated by 
the prospect of laying the Nordstream Gas Pipeline. 
Relations are most frayed between Russia and 
Estonia, with Lithuanian-Russian contacts being a 
blend of pragmatic cooperation and spats, for 
instance over cuts in oil supplies, and Latvia 
displaying the most far-reaching pragmatism. 
LITHUANIA has for years tried to maintain a policy of 
pragmatic relations with Russia. However, the sale of 
the Mozejki refinery to a Polish investor, and not a 
Russian one, has lead to the suspension of oil 
supplies in August 2006, under the pretext of 
technical glitches. In this matter, the Kremlin 
continues to pressure Vilnius. In 2007, Transneft 
representatives who operate the pipeline implied that 
repairs may take longer than expected, if they were 
possible at all. Lithuanian-Russian rapport is also 
shaped by the former’s activeness in promoting 
democracy in the post-Soviet region, and especially 
in Belarus, as well as supporting its countries’ 
European and Atlantic aspirations. 
LATVIA has agreed to sign a border agreement with 
Russia in March 2007, giving up its efforts to recover 
the Abrene district, lost in 1944. The Latvian side 
clearly expects concessions in energy, hoping that 
cooperation with Moscow will lead to increased 
security in this domain. Plans are mulled to link Latvia 
to the Northern Gas Pipeline and to build gas storage 
facilities on its territory. If successful, both variants 
would guarantee Latvia energy security whilst 
improving relations with the Russian Federation. 
Russia has also hinted that Latvia can expect 
resumption of oil transit via Ventspils, as well as 
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trade concessions.43 Meanwhile, the recently adopted 
citizenship law, requiring Latvians to pass a Latvian 
language exam, is deemed by Moscow to exemplify 
nationalistic anti-Russian discrimination, and has met 
with reservations on the part of the Council of Europe 
and concerns at the European Commission. 
Observers have pointed to improvements in the 
situation over the past few years: Russian youth 
gladly passed their Latvian exams and accepted 
Latvian passports, which provided them with an 
opportunity to travel and work elsewhere in the EU. 
ESTONIA’s policy is to a large extent dominated by 
historical and demographic issues. The sizeable 
Russian minority, which arrived after 1945 as part of 
Moscow’s colonisation drive, is treated as a threat to 
freshly won independence. Open conflict was 
provoked by the clash over the removal of a soviet 
era war memorial from the centre of Tallinn in April 
2007. Estonia was decisively backed by the EU, 
NATO and Washington, especially as the Kremlin 
tolerated the siege of the Estonian Embassy in 
Moscow and the Baltic state became the first 
European victim of a large-scale cyber-attack from 
the territory of the Russian Federation. Faced with 
the assertive stance of Estonia’s allies, Russia 
decided to ease the conflict. 
 
i. Romania has made its choice 
Romania describes itself as an actively pro-European 
and pro-Atlantic state, which explains its scepticism 
with regard to prospects of closer cooperation with 
Russia. This is especially poignant in two policy 
                                                     
43 Joanna Hyndle, Miryna Kutysz, “Lotwa i Rosja podpisaly 
traktat graniczny”, Biuletyn OSW, no. 5, April 4, 2007. 
areas. Bucharest supports plans to diversify energy 
supplies. Even before entering the European Union, 
Traian Basescu, its president, warned of Russia’s 
over-mighty role in European energy industry.44 All 
the while, Romania is tightening its military bonds 
with NATO and the United States, as attested to by 
the building of an American base on its soil. This has 
resulted in Moscow refraining from any further 
initiatives in its relations with Bucharest. 
 
j. Poland—good relations, but not at any 
price 
Following a brief period of efforts by Poland and 
Russia to elaborate a new model for bilateral ties, 
relations between Poland and Russia Poland remains 
the exception in the Russian Federation’s policy to 
the extent that Moscow is perceived as trying to 
maintain icy bilateral relations and to isolate the 
former soviet satellite. 
Under Boris Yeltsin’s presidency the rapport warmed 
somewhat—Soviet troops were withdrawn and 
responsibility for the massacre of Polish officers in 
Katyn accepted. In turn, the Polish state assumed 
material responsibility for estates left in the East by 
Polish citizens in the aftermath of post-war border 
shifts and attendant mass relocations. Concurrently, 
Poland’s striving for NATO membership has led to 
durable tension in Polish-Russian relations. 
The advent of president Vladimir Putin brought 
further regress in mutual relations. Presumably, this 
is connected with the evaluation of Poland’s role on 
the global stage—both present and future. 
                                                     
44 Statement from November 11, 2006. 
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Russian authorities view Poland as impinging their 
interests through: 
1. Polish involvement in the postsoviet 
region—the country’s role during Ukraine’s 
Orange Revolution, including cementing the 
alliance of EU states for democratic 
elections, aid to democratic opposition in 
Belarus and pronouncements of solidarity 
with Georgia in its relations with Moscow; 
2. Active support for Ukrainian and Georgian 
NATO and EU membership; 
3. Emphasis on NATO’s traditional defence role 
in Europe and the purport of Article 5 of the 
North-Atlantic Treaty; 
4. Readiness to participate in allied 
interventions in various parts of the globe; 
5. Efforts to prop up Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 
including the creation of European armed 
forces; 
6. Efforts to increase American presence in 
Europe, including approval to house on 
Polish territory element of the Missile 
Defence system; 
7. Efforts to increase energy security at the 
expense of Russian gas supplies and 
opposition to the Nordstream Gas Pipeline; 
8. Hampering or blocking Russian consortia 
from acquiring Polish companies, especially 
those deemed to be of strategic importance. 
As a result, Poland remains a blank spot on 
the map of European investments by 
Russian energy firms (such as Gazprom or 
Lukoil). 
 
Despite all this, economic relations are developing 
dynamically. Polish exports to the Russian Federation 
have experienced annual increase of 30% in the 
years 2000-2005, and of 20% in 2005-2006. Polish 
entrepreneurs are investing in Russia, without any 
reports of any significant obstacles to their economic 
activity. 
Subsequent Polish governments—both right- and 
the leftwing—have frequently declared the wish to 
improve political relations with Moscow. 
The situation worsened on November 10, 2005, 
when Russia imposed a ban on Polish meat, with 
another ban on plant based products coming into 
force four days later, under the pretext of worries 
over quality and export documents. Numerous talks 
and negotiations between experts and ministers, 
including those responsible for agriculture and 
foreign affairs, have not brought any results. 
Although on February 21, 2006, Sergey 
Yastrzhembsky, president Putin’s special envoy to 
Poland declared willingness to resolve the conflict, as 
did Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, on 
October 4-5, 2006, no steps followed that would lead 
to lifting of the export ban and improved relations. 
The European Commission has declared Russian 
conduct as a breach of signed accords and has 
undertaken initiatives to get Russia to lift the 
embargo. Nor has the involvement of leading 
European figures, such as chancellor Angela Merkel, 
had any effect. 
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Polish government and president have frequently 
repeated that Moscow’s behaviour is tantamount to 
creating one set of rules for most European countries 
and a separate one for Poland. This ultimately led to 
the Polish veto in November 2006 over giving the 
European Commission the mandate to open 
negotiations with Russia on a new Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, the so-called PCA2. 
In the ensuing situation Poland’s policy within the EU 
has striven above all to change European 
perceptions of Russia and ensure EU support for 
Poland and the Baltic states. This met with resistance 
in some European capitals, mainly due to what many 
see as “anti-EU” policy of Poland’s president and 
prime minister. There is no doubt, however, that it is 
Kremlin’s policy of the past few years that has finally 
resulted in Brussels, and individual capitals, 
accepting that president Putin’s administration is 
trying to cause rifts within the EU and that the EU’s 
internal unity and the bloc’s future relations with the 
Russian Federation require supporting Poland and 
the Baltic states. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The European Union—hopes and reality 
 
As a result of new forms of cooperation and EU 
enlargement EU-Russia relations have over the past 
few years both “broadened” and “deepened”.45 On 
the other hand, however, this growing 
interdependence has gone hand in hand with a rising 
number of  real and potential conflicts, which justifies 
speaking not just of tensions, but of a crisis in the 
rapport between the EU and the Russian Federation. 
Initially, this crisis of confidence was veiled by the 
intention to negotiate a new treaty to replace the 
current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA), which is theoretically in force, but lacks 
practical implementation. Inability to open talks finally 
brought to light this crisis situation and illustrated an 
increasingly convergent, critical view of Russia in 
individual member states. This phenomenon was 
compounded by the exchange of political elites in EU 
countries normally considered Moscow’s main 
partners, i.e. in Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
a. Closer to a single vision of Russia? 
The differences between individual member states’ 
stance in regard to Russia sketched in chapter two 
demonstrate the difficulty lying in agreeing on a 
shared view of Russian domestic and foreign policy, 
not even to mention elaborating a joint response to 
Russian conduct. This problem notwithstanding, 
                                                     
45 See Marius Vahl, “A Privileged Partnership? EU-Russian 
Relations in a Comparative Perspective”, DIIS Working Paper no. 
2006/3, p. 3. 
recent years have witnessed a growing number of EU 
states expect working out a single stance towards 
Russia and stressing shared values as an important 
foundation of any partnership. This is not an attitude 
confined to “new” members, as it is also present in 
the Nordic countries and Great Britain. The European 
Commission and the European Parliament have also 
been attempting to harmonize EU policy towards the 
bloc’s biggest neighbour.46 
 One of the more important processes that 
began approximately with the Russian-Ukrainian spat 
over gas supplies in January 2006 has been the 
emergence in Europe of a relatively coherent vision 
of Russia, plus the dissipation of illusions among 
European states with regard to Russia’s willingness 
to institute a real rapprochement. Another powerful 
signal in this evolution has been the toughening of 
stance in France and Germany, to wit the countries 
which Moscow could usually count on to refrain from 
public criticism of its demeanour. In the run-up to the 
European Council summit in Lahti on October 20, 
2006, also to be attended by president Vladimir 
Putin, French and German leaders called on Russia to 
sign the Energy Charter and the Transit Protocol, 
while on October 17, the EU Council issued a 
statement rebuking Russian policy towards Georgia. 
Still, debates within individual EU bodies (the EU 
Council of foreign and defence ministers, and the 
                                                     
46 Vahl, “A Privileged Partnership?...”, pp. 4-5. Dov Lynch 
shows that the process of change in perceptions of Russia 
among European elites began as early as 2004, with Ukraine’s 
Orange Revolution constituting an important turning point. See 
Dov Lynch “Same view, different realities: EU and US policy 
towards Russia”, [in:] Marcin Zaborowski (ed.), Friends again? 
EU-US relations after the crisis, Paris: ISS EU 2006, pp. 160-
162. 
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European Parliament) preceding the EU-Russia 
summit in May 2007 in Samara, threw light on the 
framework underlying EU policy towards Russia. 
Despite the EU institutions’ critical evaluation, no 
permission was given to pressure Moscow—for 
instance, the European Commission denied any 
intentions to block Russia’s entry into the WTO, as 
earlier leaks to the press had suggested. 
Thus, while opinions of what are generally deemed 
negative trends in Russian policy seem to be 
converging, the EU lacks a single resolution to the 
ensuing problems, all the more so given that EU 
governments still see the need to tread carefully due 
to their individual economic interests in Russia. 
Moreover, counting on positive changes in future, 
they regard dialogue as important in its own right. 
The European Parliament remains the EU institution 
most critical of Russia. In a resolution passed on 
October 25, 2006, in response to the death of 
journalist Anna Politovskaya, which also contained a 
critical reaction to the Lahti summit attended by 
president Putin, the European Parliament called on 
the EU to come to a new accord with Russia, based 
on the principles of democracy and human rights, 
and to raise these issues in on-going political 
dialogue. It also condemned policy with regard to the 
media and the new law on non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). In another resolution, dated 
May 10, 2007, the Parliament sternly rebuked the 
Kremlin for the way it conducts its domestic and 
foreign policy. While reasserting that Russia remains 
an important partner in strategic cooperation, it 
stressed the importance of EU unity in regard to its 
neighbour and expressed concern over the state of 
human rights in Russia. It emphasised that human 
rights and democratic values ought to constitute the 
core of any future agreement, and made financial aid 
contingent on observance of human rights. It also 
exhorted the EU to “demonstrate solidarity with 
Estonia”, denounced the use of force against 
opposition protesters by St. Petersburg and Moscow 
authorities in March 2007, and, on security related 
matters, articulated anxiety over Mr Putin’s 
comments regarding intentions to train missiles on 
targets in Europe, also calling on Russia not to delay 
the adoption of the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo.47 
Clearly, such stances carry certain weight, but the 
European Parliament’s effectiveness in moulding a 
uniform EU attitude to Russia, in other words, its 
influence over government policy in individual 
member states, remains limited. 
 
The process of creating a single policy, beginning 
with a shared vision, is still in its infancy. Peter 
Mandelson, EU trade commissioner, summed it up 
nicely when he described EU-Russia relations as 
containing a “level of misunderstanding or even 
mistrust we have not seen since the end of the Cold 
War.”48 Each side suspects the other of double 
standards, convinced that the other is using energy 
policy as a weapon and sensing a lack of respect on 
the part of the partner. 
 
                                                     
47 European Parliament resolutions, see: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2006-0448+0+DOC+XML+V`0//EN 
and http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-0178+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
48 Mandelson, op.cit. 
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b. Functioning of EU-Russian bilateral 
institutions in recent years 
EU-Russian relations are based on solid legal and 
political foundations for bilateral dialogue. With no 
other country does the EU have such a wide-ranging 
and formalized rapport, describe in EU documents 
and in statements by EU representatives as a 
strategic partnership.49 The basis for this relationship 
is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or 
PCA, which was signed in 1994 and entered into 
force in 1997. Its most important supplement are the 
so-called Four Common Spaces: economic, external 
security, internal security and education, science and 
culture. Additional elements include: industry 
agreements, Energy Dialogue (initiated in 2000) and 
institutionalized political dialogue. On the regional 
level EU-Russian cooperation rests on the so-called 
Northern Dimension.50 Political dialogue is 
institutionalized in the following formulae: summit 
meetings (twice a year); Permanent Partnership 
Council (which functions at the ministerial level for 
different sectors); human rights consultations (since 
2004); meetings of the EU “troika” with the Russian 
Federation’s foreign minister; meetings of top civil 
servants and experts. Russia is the sole country with 
which the EU holds two annual meetings, while the 
                                                     
49 See Derek Averre, ‘Russia and the European Union: 
Convergence or Divergence?’, European Security, Vol. 14, No. 
2, June 2005, p. 175. 
50 At the Helsinki summit of 2006 the so-called Northern 
Dimension was overhauled. Its new scope encompasses the EU, 
Russia, Norway and Island. A Political Declaration and a 
Framework Document were adopted. The formula’s principle 
task is to support cooperation between European states and 
the northwest regions of Russia (including Kaliningrad) in 
politically uncontroversial areas. At the same time, the Northern 
Dimension demonstrates on what conditions EU-Russian 
agreement is feasible. 
Permanent Partnership Council is a one of a kind 
body. Then there are the troika’s unique monthly 
encounters over European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) involving high ranking officials. Since 
2000, policy dialogues with Russia have covered 
energy, foreign affairs, security and defence, and, 
recently, transport.51 Still, two issues are worthy of 
note: 
1. Despite the existence of PCA, the principal 
institutional forums for EU-Russia relations 
are political dialogue and the so-called 
Common Spaces;52 
2. Despite extensive institutional infrastructure, 
mutual relations are becoming increasingly 
abrasive. 
The feeble functioning of institutions thus far and 
their inability to solve bilateral problems have not 
weakened the EU’s readiness to achieve a qualitative 
improvement in relations with Russia. The Finnish 
presidency was the first to try this, by inviting 
president Putin to the European Council’s Lahti 
summit in October 2006, or attempting to open talks 
on the so-called PCA2. Later, the German presidency 
wanted to follow in its predecessor’s footsteps, but it 
was forced to focus above all on acquiring the 
                                                     
51 Vahl, ‘A Privileged Partnership?...’, pp. 8-9. 
52 In the case of the common spaces the main achievements of 
2006 included : signing an accord on readmission and visa 
facilitation; protocol on the abolition of payments for trans-
Siberian flights; fisheries agreement; agreement on cooperation 
between Frontex and Russian border guard; resolution of 
Romania’s and Bulgaria’s phytosanitary difficulties; opening in 
Moscow of a European institute; establishment of Europol 
contact points; improve cooperation in crisis management; 
implementation of the EMERCOM agreement on civil protection. 
Economic space: PCC meetings of environment, transport and 
energy ministers. However, subcommittees are in abeyance. EU-
Russia Industrialists’ Roundtable is an important body. Cf. ‘EU-
Russia Common Spaces: Progress Report 2006’. 
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mandate to begin negotiations with Russia on the 
new treaty. 
The Lahti meeting came to nought. It was meant to 
demonstrate the special character of the European 
Union’s rapport with Russia. Instead, it only served to 
underscore important differences between the 
Russian Federation and the EU on the question of 
further cooperation. The atmosphere at the 
subsequent EU-Russia summit in Helsinki in 
November 2006 was far removed from Russian 
expectations. Since Moscow did not ease its 
restrictive trade policy, Poland continued to demur at 
giving the European Commission the mandate to 
undertake negotiations, resulting in a failure to 
commence talks on the new treaty to regulate the 
legal framework for relations between the Russian 
Federation and the European Union. Concomitantly, 
the death of Alexander Litvinenko has had negative 
bearing on Russia’s image in the West, all the more 
so given that it occurred less than two months after 
the assassination of opposition journalist Anna 
Politkovskaya. 
Failure to begin talks on the new legal framework for 
EU-Russia relations came to be seen as Moscow’s 
prestigious defeat, especially in view of the fact that 
Russian officials’ pre-summit enunciations clearly 
indicated that Russia is counting on other EU 
countries and institutions to coax Poland out of its 
veto. Still, both Russian Federation’s official envoys 
and the Russian media made light of the sustained 
Polish veto, laying the blame for the failure to 
commence negotiations squarely on the Europeans. 
The subsequent summit in Samara on May 17-18, 
2007, ended without any agreement being reached, 
albeit to lower European expectations.53 Above all it 
laid bare the stagnation in Moscow-Brussels relations 
and shortage of areas where understanding is 
possible. The attitude of leading EU figures, including 
public expressions of solidarity with Poland, has 
shown that Russian policy of dividing EU members 
into the better and the worse is failing. Although both 
sides did what they could to mitigate the impression 
of impending crisis in EU-Russia relations, the lack of 
the habitual shared communiqué goes to show that 
the talks encountered serious differences. The sole 
agreements reached pertained to maintaining the 
present transit system between the Russian 
Federation and Kaliningrad on Latvia’s entry into 
Schengen, and to the promise of further talks on an 
early-warning system in the energy domain and on 
improving investment climate. The topic of prospects 
for PCA2 was not broached.  
The press conference at the close of the summit 
provided yet another opportunity for a polemic pitting 
Vladimir Putin against EU representatives. Mr Putin 
made futile attempts to play out the differences 
between old and new EU members (e.g. by pointing 
to the negative consequences of the EU’s eastward 
enlargement and accusing Poland of unwillingness to 
discuss the meat embargo). In response Ms Merkel 
and Mr Barroso unequivocally stressed that the 
disagreement over the embargo is an EU-Russian 
problem, also admonishing Russia for its violation of 
civil rights and liberties. 
                                                     
53 Commentators regarded the very fact that it actually took 
place as its main success. 
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There is no doubt that Russia’s relations with the EU 
have entered a crisis phase.54 The scope for 
understanding has shrunk.  
As one Russian commentator put it, following the 
Samara summit there is no hiding the fact that the 
EU’s and Russia’s political courses are moving off in 
different directions and this will not be stopped by 
any increase in trade volume, direct investment or 
conceptions of energy relations. Suddenly, the 
differences that emerged over values, sovereignty 
and human rights proved too great, all against the 
background of anxiety that the Kremlin’s new found 
“assertiveness” over security matters really does 
threaten Russia’s immediate geopolitical vicinity, and 
hurting the EU’s interests and its vision of 
international relations. Cooperation is only plausible 
in narrow areas of mutual relations and in specific, 
mainly economic, domains (sectors) and even this 
space is not immune from contraction. Subsequent 
documents adopted at EU-Russia summits are 
becoming increasingly less ambitious and evince the 
EU’s de facto acknowledgment of the fact that Russia 
is guided by a different set of values and that its 
policy is unfavourable to the EU.55 
The stagnation in EU-Russia relations was confirmed 
during the Mafra Summit (in Portugal) on October 
26th, 2007. The event ended with the signing of a 
memorandum on the fight against drugs and an 
agreement to increase quotas for steel imports from 
the RF. Paltry results and the inability to reach a 
consensus on principal matters emphatically showed 
                                                     
54 Cf. Marek Menkiszak, “Russia vs. Europe: a ‘strategic 
partnership’ crisis”, CES studies, No. 22, January 2006. 
55 Ekaterina S. Kuznetsova, “Malosovmestimyie partniory”, 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28.05.2007. 
that the current formula for EU-Russia cooperation 
has been exhausted. In the EU the prevalent 
conviction is that since the problems are due to 
Russian policy the ball is in Russia’s court. 
 
c. The problems they are a-growin’ 
The catalogue of differences that persist between the 
European Union and Russia is systematically 
supplemented with issues such as: rules of economic 
cooperation and energy policy, policy towards the 
shared neighbourhood, i.e. the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and Russia’s policy towards its 
own neighbours, Russian domestic policy and the 
issues of democracy, human rights and civil liberties, 
conflicts in Europe (in Kosovo and in the CIS region), 
or security policy in Europe. 
The principal difference in Brussels rapport with 
Russia stems primarily form the two sides’ disparate 
visions of future mutual relations, and consequently 
of the form of PCA2 (see below). Russia seems 
confident of its strength and its main demand is for 
the EU to recognize this regained superpower status 
and the attendant special rights in the post-Soviet 
area, and to maintain relations with the EU on equal 
terms (Russia regards the current model of mutual 
relations as skewed in favour of the EU). The 
European Union, meanwhile, wants to bind Russia 
with a series of rules pertaining to the domains of 
investment, energy, democracy and human rights. 
 
Energy Policy 
Energy remains the greatest hurdle in mutual 
relations. Energy dialogue, initiated in 2000, has not 
hitherto provided answers to any of the important 
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questions. Russia is making western consortia 
gaining access to its resources contingent on the EU 
permitting Gazprom to enter western  European gas 
distribution markets. Key EU players (especially 
Germany and France) are prepared to tighten ties 
with Russia, but in return demand specific 
concessions, above all opening up markets, 
principally that in energy, to their companies, and 
ensuring security of investments and gas supplies. To 
this end, they are trying to get Russia to ratify the 
Energy Charter and the Transit Protocol, which would 
go a long way to augment energy security of all EU 
members (and neighbouring countries such as 
Ukraine). In turn, Moscow demands rewriting certain 
provisions of both documents, and especially the 
Protocol, to account for Russian interests, in 
particular retaining Gazprom’s monopoly in Russia’s 
market for gas extraction and transport. 
The Ukraine gas crisis was a rude awakening for 
Europe. The EU is concerned that tapping gas 
reserves is restricted due to low investment, with the 
additional worry of foreign firms’ increasingly limited 
presence in the Russian energy sector. Failure to 
ratify the abovementioned Transit Protocol allows 
Gazprom to maintain its monopoly of gas transit 
through Central Asia (meanwhile, one third of the gas 
supplied to Europe by Gazprom is Turkmenian).56 All 
the while, Russia is feeling strong following Mr Putin’s 
June 2007visit to Central Asia, betting on maintaining 
its position in the region and convinced that Europe 
shall remain dependent on Russian energy. 
                                                     
56 Katinka Barysch, The EU and Russia: From principle to 
pragmatism?, Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief, 
November 2006, p. 4. 
Another vexed question arises with the ideas being 
floated by some governments, e.g. in Germany and 
the UK, to pass regulations hampering (if not 
completely arresting) foreign de facto state-
controlled consortia or investment funds flush with 
huge financial surpluses from acquiring companies of 
what is deemed strategic importance. China, Russia 
and Arab states are publically named. Any attempt to 
purchase a sizeable chunk of such companies’ 
shares would require government approval. One 
factor which influenced EU attitudes in this domain 
was the surprise purchase in October 2006 by the 
state-owned Vneshekonombank of a 5% stake in 
EADS, followed by Russian demands for involvement 
in the conglomerate’s management. Günter 
Verheugen, vice-president of the European 
Commission had earlier expressed his support for a 
similar proposal.57 
Moreover, the European Commission is considering 
limiting access to the European energy sector for 
investors hailing from countries were European firms 
meet analogous constraints (Russia, China and Arab 
states have again been indicated).58 Tentative 
proposals in this domain were given a public hearing 
on September 13, 2007, when Jose M. Barroso, the 
Commission’s president, told reporters that in the 
energy sector the EU must, of course, be open, but 
cannot be naive. Since the European Commission 
defends the internal market against intervention by 
                                                     
57 Lorraine Mallinder, “Verheugen warns off sovereign-fund 
raiders”, European Voice, 26.07-1.08.2007. 
58 See Wolfgang Proissl and Ed Crooks, ‘Russian energy faces 
EU barriers’, Financial Times, 30.08.2007.  
For a similar view, see Katinka Barysch, “The best answer to 
Gazprom is faster reform”, Financial Times, 3.09.2007. 
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some member states, then it must also defend it 
against intervention by third countries, adding that: 
“We want to have a mechanism which, if needed, can 
be activated if behind the intervention of a company 
(there are) motives which are not commercial, which 
can influence security...”  
Though Barroso refused to point to any specific 
country or company, he admitted to finding it 
'strange' that a company like Russian giant Gazprom 
can buy a European energy distribution firm while a 
European company cannot buy a concern producing 
energy in Russia. This was the first time the demand 
for equal treatment of corporations in both markets 
was aired in so unambiguous a manner. 
For its part, on September 19th, 2007, the European 
Commission publicly broached the issue, immediately 
dubbed the “Gazprom clause” in Brussels. As part of 
far-reaching reform of EU energy market 
liberalization, the Commission inserted a provision 
which prohibits foreign firms hailing from countries 
that do not apply the principle of freedom of 
economic activity to EU companies from gaining 
majority stakes in the European energy industry. 
Since the European market is of great importance to 
the Russian economy, Moscow will doubtless treat 
such decisions as hurting its interests. 
 
Policy towards neighbours 
Another key problem in EU-Russian relations is the 
so-called common neighbourhood, and specifically 
the region of the CIS. Russia views EU engagement in 
this area as aimed at undermining its own influence 
and directed against its interests. One symptom of 
this stance was opposition to the idea of a European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) when it was first 
articulated, as well as ostentatious discontent when 
the EU adopted its Central Asia strategy in mid 2007. 
Moscow persistently demands that the EU accept the 
Russian Federation’s special interests in the post-
Soviet region. Meanwhile, Moscow’s policy towards 
Tbilisi is perceived by the EU as a destabilizing force 
in the South Caucasus, covered by the ENP and 
treated as a transport corridor for supplies of energy 
resources from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea 
basin. Support for Belarusian autocracy, the Orange 
Revolution and elections in Ukraine and Georgia’s 
pro-western stand have all revealed Russia’s and the 
EU’s conflicting interests in post-Soviet areas. 
Moscow’s policy is labelled as bullying neighbouring 
states. Gazprom provides Russia with a means to 
coerce its neighbours in a situation where Moscow is 
forced to withdraw its troops from their territory. 
Russia is also supporting local authorities in rogue 
enclaves, thereby delaying the resolution of the so-
called “frozen conflicts” which the Kremlin links 
directly to its own way of settling the Kosovo 
question. With respect to its neighbours, Russia is 
more source of the problems, and not the solution, 
frustrating their efforts to  make the most of their 
sovereignty and autonomy. 
 
Russia’s internal policy 
Moscow’s other persistent demand is to desist from 
criticizing its departure from democracy and to 
accept the Russian political model of so-called 
“sovereign democracy” on equal terms with liberal 
democracy. The bloody crackdown on rebellious 
Chechens, curtailed civil liberties, assassination of 
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journalist Anna Politkovskaya and the Russian 
authorities’ response to these events, killings of 
many other journalists, as well as repressive 
measures against  Georgians living in the Russian 
Federation (in response to the detention in 2006 in 
Tbilisi of four Russian officers charged with 
espionage) confirm Russia’s growing authoritarian 
tendencies. The EU has underscored falling Russian 
standards in three domains: democracy, human 
rights and press freedom. It also reacted negatively 
to an escalation in Kremlin’s persecution of its 
political opponents, including heavy-handed quelling 
of street protests in March 2007, combined with 
restrictions on activity of political parties and myriad 
independent community associations. 
 
Conflicts in Europe 
The future of Kosovo is a special case. Russia 
disposes of sufficient potential to destabilize the 
region, specifically by shoring up Belgrade’s 
opposition to the prospect of the province’s 
independence. The Kremlin’s motives in this regard 
are both strategic (avoiding a precedent, promoting 
the notion of a concert of powers) and tactical 
(exacerbating extant transatlantic rifts and splits 
within the EU itself, delaying Serbia’s eventual 
accession to the EU). As a result, cooperation with 
Russia in this area may prove extremely difficult. 
 
Anti-western foreign and security policy 
There is a growing conviction, increasingly being 
articulated by the European media and, more 
discretely, some politicians and diplomats, that 
Moscow is positioning itself no longer just as a 
proponent of multilateralism, i.e. opponent of the 
United States’ unilateral global policy, but also 
antagonist of both the USA and the EU—for now in 
Russia’s direct geopolitical vicinity, in future on a 
global scale. 
The European Union’s immediate problem is the way 
Russia is behaving with regard to its neighbours, 
including some EU members, such as Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia. The EU is thus becoming 
increasingly critical of Russian foreign policy, for 
example Russia’s use of economic pressure (Polish 
meat embargo,  cuts in oil supplies to Lithuania) or 
political coercion (the campaign against Estonia). 
The dispute between Moscow and Washington over 
the missile defence shield may bear negatively first 
and foremost on European security. It is Europe that 
will be hardest hit by its real and potential 
consequences invoked by Russia, such as 
suspending the implementation of the Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, exit from the Treaty 
Between the United States of America and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of 
Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
Missiles. Besides, the Kremlin is doubtless bent on 
propping up existent rifts in transatlantic relations. 
 
d. Is PCA2 on the cards? 
The discussion surrounding the new legal framework 
for EU-Russia relations began in 2005, as expiry of 
the 1997 PCA was drawing near.59 Initially, Moscow 
                                                     
59 PCA was signed in 1994, but it was ratified by EU member 
states only in 1997 as a result of the Chechen war in Russia. It 
officially expires on December 1, 2007, but if neither party 
denounces the treaty before six months are out, it shall be 
automatically extended for another year. 
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favoured negotiating and signing a new agreement, 
albeit making it clear that it shall not consent to 
including therein any references to Russia’s internal 
situation. Tensions over energy policy intensified EU 
pressure to include in the new document security 
guarantees, which Russian diplomats have resisted. 
The situation worsened at the end of 2006, 
beginning of 2007. In October 2006 Poland refused 
to agree to give the European Commission the 
mandate to undertake talks on the treaty. Russia 
blamed the European Union. Simultaneously, sensing 
inability to force through its own vision of the treaty, 
Moscow began to pay increasingly less attention to 
the whole matter. 
Within the EU, there was (and still is, though less 
heated) debate over the purposefulness of 
negotiating a new treaty. The European Union is 
striving to found its relations with Russia on this 
accord, to “base it on a new foundation.” It ought to 
replace the current PCA in order to “better reflect the 
actual nature and potential of our partnership.”60 
Such all-encompassing agreement should be legally 
binding to both parties, and should precisely regulate 
their obligations and ways of meeting them, be it in 
the domain of values, human rights or energy. 
The Russian Federation is expecting a generalist 
document that would be legally binding and in force 
for at least a decade, focused on principles and 
objectives, referring specific policies to separate 
agreements, e.g. on fisheries, visas or energy 
transit.61 Russia is trying to foist its stance with 
                                                     
60 Waldner, op.cit. p. 4. 
61 Cf. Statements by Vladimir Chizhov, Russia’s EU 
representative, for Vremia Novostei (21.11.2006) and 
regard to the treaty on the EU. It wants a document 
highlighting the equal nature of EU-Russia relations, 
crowning its return to superpower status. Moscow 
desires a document which would not raise sensitive 
issues, such as respect for human rights and 
principles of democracy, or conditions underlying 
energy cooperation, which would limit the option of 
using supplies of energy resource to political ends. 
Were the EU to insist on incorporating in the new 
treaty such issues as the rules of energy cooperation 
or specific commitments in the domain of human 
rights, it would be to Moscow’s advantage to prolong 
the status quo and extend the extant PCA on an 
annual basis. All the more so, seeing that concluding 
PCA2 before Russian presidential elections would be 
virtually impossible, correspondingly making the 
whole affair a less potent propaganda tool from the 
Kremlin’s perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                               
Nezavisimaya Gazeta (5.02.2007). Among Russian scholars 
similar ideas were voiced by Timofei Bordachov “Na puti k 
strategicheskomu soyuzu” Rossiya v globalnoy politike no. 1 
Yanvar-Fevral 2006. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Crisis management—towards EU’s single 
Russia policy 
 
The present analysis of Russia policy is necessarily 
schematic. However, the perspective of a decade or 
so permits discerning certain characteristic trends, 
including the dynamic of continuity or change. 
The European Union stresses Russia’s importance to 
the EU on three levels—economic, regional and 
global. EU interests in relation to the Russian 
Federation are largely determined by land proximity, 
dramatic history, hope for Russia’s democratic 
development in keeping with the European model, 
conviction about Moscow’s growing clout in 
international relations and energy needs. 
Both sides declare attachment to shared values, such 
as principles of democracy, respect of human rights, 
the rule of law and market economy.62 The problem 
lies in Moscow’s specific manner of going about 
implementing these high-minded precepts, which fly 
in the face of EU or Council of Europe standards. 
As recently as two or three years ago there were 
important differences between EU member states, 
especially between the biggest “old” European 
countries and many “new” members both, as regards 
both analysis of, and policy towards Russia. The tone 
of Russia policy was being set by France under 
president Chirac and Germany under chancellor 
Schroeder, which attempted to quell the ever louder 
critiques and to enliven economic relations against 
the backdrop of opposition, shared with Moscow, 
                                                     
62 Cf. “EU-Russia Relations”, op.cit., p. 3. 
against what was regarded as America’s and its 
allies’ unilateral military intervention in Iraq. Most EU 
member states from Central and Eastern Europe 
voiced their reservations about such overt anti-
Americanism, some even sending troops to Iraq. 
These tensions were further exacerbated by the 
sense of inability to elaborate a shared stance in 
regard to Russia.  
Russian diplomacy, shored up by state-controlled or 
eager media, popularized the thesis that relations 
would thrive were it not for Poland and the Baltic 
states, which are driven by historical, post-colonial 
prejudice against Russia. 
The decisive factor behind EU governments’ and 
public opinion’s growing criticism and shifting 
relations with Russia has been the Putin 
administration’s domestic and foreign policy. The 
watershed came with the suspension of gas supplies 
to Ukraine in January 2006, justified by Russia’s 
desire to get a better bargain for its gas, but 
universally read as political pressure in the aftermath 
of the Orange Revolution. Energy incidents in 
relations with Georgia and Belarus only served to 
deepen uncertainty and lend credence to those who 
had warned of Moscow’s readiness to use energy 
resources to political ends. President Putin’s Munich 
address in February 2007, deemed highly 
provocative, came as something of a shock. Although 
both the Chirac administration and the Schroeder 
government had already raised similar concern, the 
speech cemented the Atlantic bond and the sense 
that Europe is in fact set to deal with a new policy on 
the part of the Russian Federation. 
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As a result of president Vladimir Putin’s (and 
Gazprom’s) policy, in many important respects the 
divergences in analysis narrowed, or disappeared 
altogether. Nonetheless, clear differences in 
proposed policy persist. Moreover, many capitals’ 
tactics can be discerned not so much in formal policy 
statements, as in implemented diplomatic processes 
and in criticisms voiced against countries conducting 
or proposing different actions which are occasionally 
conveyed by reliable press sources. 
Commissioner Mandelson has averred that Russia, 
like no other country, brings to the fore the 
differences between member states.63 It is in the 
European Union’s interest to prevent Russia from 
taking advantage of internal EU divisions and from 
advancing its own interests at the expense of 
particular member states and the European Union as 
a whole. 
In the face of incertitude and growing pressure 
Poland and the Baltic states tried to use their EU 
membership in order to improve their position with 
respect to Russia. Other countries, such as Hungary 
or Slovakia, mimicked the biggest “old European” 
states—seeking to avoid direct confrontation and 
tighten bilateral trade relations with Russia.64 In 
return, they received not just new contracts, but also 
a reward of sorts for eschewing historical issues. This 
consisted in public admittance of Russia’s “moral 
responsibility” for the Red Army’s bloody quelling of 
the Budapest uprising in 1956 and for the military 
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (during a visit 
to Budapest and Prague in March 2006). 
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Russia’s sway over old EU member states has waned. 
Causes of such a turn of events most certainly 
include the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, as well 
as the departure of “Putin’s buddies” (Chirac, 
Schroeder, Berlusconi). Despite leaving the core of 
mutual relations intact, the climate became more 
frosty, and at times overtly critical with the advent of 
president Sarkozy in France, chancellor Merkel in 
Germany and prime minister Gordon Brown in the 
United Kingdom. 
The London murder of Alexander Litvinenko, 
combined with Russian authorities’ refusal to 
cooperate with the British justice system, at a time 
when memories of the assassination in Moscow of 
Anna Politovskaya, an independent journalist, were 
still fresh, stoked a full blown crisis between London 
and Russia. This has had clear bearing on other 
European capitals. 
Hence, the Samara summit saw EU leaders, including 
chancellor Merkel who then presided over the EU’s 
work, publicly castigated Russia for attempting to 
split EU states into the “good” and the “bad”, 
expressed solidarity with Poland over the Russian 
embargo on its meat exports, and condemned 
repressions against political opposition and instances 
of human rights’ violations. 
The attitude of leading EU figures, including public 
expressions of solidarity with Poland, was evidence 
for the fiasco of Russian policy of dividing EU 
members into the better and the worse. However, a 
resurgent Russia is feeling sufficiently powerful not to 
have to cosy up to Brussels, nor to revise its current 
policy. 
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At a time of a visible crisis of confidence with regard 
to Moscow’s ends and its means of attaining them, 
there is a growing conviction among individual EU 
institutions that elaborating a single approach in at 
least several key areas, and especially over energy, 
is absolutely necessary. The desire to deepen 
cooperation with Russia is evident and ubiquitous in 
the EU, but not at the price of undermining the bloc’s 
own internal mechanisms, development prospects or 
internal cohesion. 
The European Commission’s latest proposals, de 
facto aimed at forcing through the principle of 
reciprocity in the treatment of EU companies in 
Russian markets, constitute a signal warning and will 
certainly entail far-reaching consequences. For they 
are an attempt to circumscribe Moscow’s influence—
exercised through  Gazprom—over what are deemed 
strategically crucial areas of the EU economy. 
For a number of years leading figures from Brussels 
and the EU’s major powers have expressed their 
anxiety over Russia, as well as their hope for working 
with it to establish a common language, approach 
and policies in specific problem areas. The previous 
twelve months have witnessed substantial changes in 
this regard. There is now less hope and more anxiety 
and discussion over formulating a policy that would 
permit implementation of an effective eastern 
policy—if not with respect to the Russian Federation 
itself, then at least towards the entire post-Soviet 
region—without shutting off any paths to a possible 
future agreement. Despite occasional exasperation at 
Polish, Lithuanian or Estonian stance, it is now 
universally acknowledged that the key to improved 
relations rests in Moscow. For now, however, no one 
in the Kremlin has began to look for it. 
The Putin administration has hitherto been so 
convinced of its own strength and of the fact that the 
EU must—mainly for energy-related reasons—
accept Moscow’s conditions for cooperation, that is 
see no need to compromise. Meanwhile, it expects 
significant concessions from the EU, which the latter 
is not prepared to offer. There is also a strong belief 
among Russian elites that the present situation is not 
in any way Russia’s fault. Thus, it is any change in 
Russia’s policy towards the EU in the run-up to the 
presidential elections is unlikely. 
Enormous economic opportunities will no doubt make 
European business circles increase their pressure on 
governments to thrash out an agreement with Russia. 
This may get a sympathetic response from Germany 
and France which have already voiced their 
reservations with regard to the European 
Commission’s planned liberalization of the European 
energy market. Many EU governments believe that 
their economic interests in Russia call for caution 
and, hoping for positive future changes, view 
dialogue as important in its own right. The prevalent 
conviction in major European capitals is that in the 
long term Russian and EU interests naturally 
converge, especially as regards the external 
environment. 
Received wisdom has it that Europe needs Russia 
and Russia needs Europe. Over the coming years this 
trivial claim shall be filled with more substantive 
content that would try to accommodate both the 
requirements of pragmatic and effective policy, and 
the EU’s insistence on values as basis for strategic 
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partnership, whatever that was taken to mean in the present conditions.
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